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Abstract 
The advent of Internet technologies, growing number of sophisticated hacking tools 
and mobile workforce creates a new dimension to the malicious insider problem for 
many organisations. In spite of the significant interest from researchers and industry 
experts, trusted employees with elevated access continue to pose insider challenges to 
organisation risk mitigation efforts. It is suggested that malicious insiders show 
certain personality traits, leave behind digital footprints and observable cyber risk 
behaviour in advance of an attack. This work offers a different perspective to address 
the insider problem by drawing concepts from behavioural theory, personality 
profiling and digital trails auditing. Instead of isolated treatments, our approach 
considers the intersection of different risk domains and aggregates risk scores from 
each as a predictor of malicious insider activities. This model has significant 
implication for security professionals, to draw insight from inextricably linked risk 
domains within the context of cybersecurity management. However, substantial 
empirical work is still needed to evaluate the model in real world cases. 
Keywords: malicious insider, insider threat detection, cybersecurity, information 
security, cyber risk behaviour. 
1 Introduction 
Modern economies, the dynamics of how organisations create, process and distribute 
information; and the increased reliance on large-scale interconnected information 
systems also lead to increased cyber-risk exposure [1]. Information security is, 
therefore, a critical issue for organisations. In this cyber battle, an agent’s elevated 
access to information and services becomes potentially a vulnerability to the system, 
signifying the issue of the insider threat. As suggested in the relevant literature, 
insiders are the weakest link in organisations’ defence posture [2][3]; a system is more 
susceptible to insider threats exploitations compared to exploitations due to failures 
of technical and procedural measures. In addition, it is difficult to estimate insider 
problem because many organisations fail to report insider misuse [4]. Hence, a signi-
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ficant challenge is the design and development of an automated and cost effective 
insider threat preventive tool, which can distinguish malicious activities in advance 
of an attack.  
The advent of internet technology and sophisticated hacking tools and mobile 
workforce creates a thriving environment for malevolent employees and a whole new 
dimension to the malicious insiders’ problem. Insiders misuse of information systems 
mostly centres around destroying, modifying and stealing corporate data [4], and 
most of these illicit acts are carried out through technical capabilities. A study [5] of 
36 illicit cyber activities in the government sector suggests that 24% of incidents is 
due to unauthorised privilege users, of which 11% involves installation of backdoors. 
Similarly, in a case study of 52 cyber incidents [6], it is shown that 57% are detected 
through system irregularities of which 73% involves remote access logs and 57% 
involves unauthorised file access logs. There are limitations to the effectiveness of 
technical controls in preventing motivated insiders from carrying out malicious 
activities in an organisation [7], which is why academic researchers continue to 
investigate individual differences in personality traits, as a precursor for malevolent 
behaviour within the context of information security. 
Research linking cybersecurity compliance and human factor has expanded over the 
years, in an attempt to establish how individual differences shapes security policy 
compliance intentions. Security-related behaviour in organisation continues to 
generate research interest in the information security literature. Behavioural theories 
provide guidelines on how behaviour may manifest at different stages of an insider 
threat scenario by recognising observable ‘concerning behaviour’ that insider exhibits 
in advance of security exploits [8]. The theory of planned behaviour suggests that 
a person’s intention, perceived behaviour towards crime, subjective norms and 
attitude are key factors in predicting behaviour [9]. A study [10] shows that in 23 
cases of insider threat in the banking and finance sector, 33% is due to personal 
problems that are unrelated to employment, like breakup and anxiety; 23% is due to 
revenge, 27% is due to debt and 81% is due to financial gains. Also, based on a case 
study of 52 illicit cyber activities in the IT and Telecommunication sector, report [6] 
suggests that 33% is due to intolerant to criticism, 57% involves disgruntled 
employees, 47% is revealed through overt behaviour, and 58% involves direct 
communication of threat online. 
The high complexity of information systems along with the socio-technical nature of 
insider threats require a robust mechanism that can fuse numerous detector alerts for 
the analysis of patterns as a precursor to threats. This is particularly important because 
when activities are performed to varying degrees by both benign and malicious 
insiders, the accuracy of isolated detector alert becomes uncertain. Therefore a holistic 
interdisciplinary approach that blends technological, psychological and organisa-
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tional elements of the insider threat problem is required [11]. This work is aimed at 
developing a conceptual model of a malicious insider detection system that can 
combine threat indicators from different inter-related domains in order to prevent 
cyber risk while lowering false-positive thresholds and background noise. We based 
each risk indicator on a hypothesis about malicious insider personality traits, 
behavioural patterns and technical footprints, supported with evidence from 
academic literature and subject experts’ opinion. We draw concepts from the theory 
of planned behaviour, the ‘big five’ personality dimensions and technical anomaly 
detection, such that, different elements of threat that are inextricably linked from 
different domains is a function of the malicious insider problem. This model could 
be useful in ordering highly significant developing insider threats that require security 
analysts’ review and could also provide further insights for collective management of 
information security in organisations. 
The structure of this report is as follows; section 2 covers related work and the 
motivation for this work. The background description of our conceptual model is 
presented in section 3. Method and preliminary design are covered in section 4, while 
section 5 covers the conclusion and future work. 
2 Related Work 
While it is not a new area of research, the work in the domain of insider threat 
prediction has continued to generate interest among researchers. Previous studies 
indicate the inadequacy of attempts to address the human factor in cyber security 
despite the evidence that a malicious insider exhibits an observable ‘concerning 
behaviour’ in advance of the actual exploit [8]. There have been a variety of 
approaches to solving the malicious insider problem, some studies are based on 
behavioural analysis of a malicious insider to understand the key drivers of malevolent 
intentions. For instance, [12] combines real-time technical data information obtained 
from users’ information systems with their psychometric test score data, then applies 
decision algorithm in order to assess their predisposition to malicious behaviour. In 
a related study [13], an analytical model to simulate adversary behaviour is presented, 
it describes malicious insider threats through a devised taxonomy of attributes like 
access, risk, knowledge, process and motivation, in order to analyse how each or 
a combination of these attributes stimulate malicious insiders’ behaviour. Also [14], 
applies cognitive dissonance and neutralisation theory to insider perception and 
behaviour, to establish a link between rationalisation and the likelihood of an insider 
to commit a crime. Some literature also emphasises the importance of recognising 
early signs of risky behaviour. In that light, a predictive model that can assist with 
risk mitigation decision is presented by [15], the work describes an automated model 
for the support and detection of high-risk behavioural indicators. Similarly, the work 
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proposed by [16], evaluates the probability of IT misuse through the lens of multi-
level hierarchical layers of threat components, the work provides an insight on how 
users’ behaviour at the system level can be harnessed to predict computer misuse that 
originates from legitimate users. 
In terms of technical assessment, [17] shows how technical tools like the intrusion 
detection/prevention systems (IDS/IPS), and log analysis can be leveraged to uncover 
insider activities, while [18] describes how insider threat problems can be mitigated 
through resilience, survivability and security by combining the technical assessment 
of information asset categorization with agents behaviour categorization. In terms of 
personality attributes, some research emphasises the link between personality traits 
and the tendency to become a malicious insider. For instance, [19] suggests that the 
personality trait of narcissism is a common characteristic of malicious insiders, while 
[7] presents a personality evaluation approach that links cyber-security protocol 
violation to the personality trait of a malicious insider, depending on deterrence, 
protection motivation or efficacy factors. While recognising that insider threat 
constitutes a problem which already has damaging consequences for organisations, 
insider threats cannot always be detected or appropriately addresses with technical 
solutions alone [20], and there is a need for a framework that encompasses multiple 
risk indicators for a holistic and predictive threat detection [21][22]. This work 
recognises the important contribution of other models, however, to the best of our 
knowledge, we believe that our model offers a different perspective to detecting 
malevolent activities by considering the intersection of personality traits, behavioural 
risks and technical footprints indicators as a single block. This analytical model will 
allow security managers to draw insights from inextricably linked variables from 
independent domains, to address insider problems within the context of cybersecurity 
management. 
3 Background Description of the Conceptual Model 
An important consideration here is that due to the introductory and analytic 
modelling of this work, this paper did not provide in-depth analysis of the 
quantifying metrics and weighting factors assigned to each insider threat indicators. 
It should be noted that assigned weights are subjective and depend on the expertise 
of the human resources, data analytics, cybersecurity teams and the risk tolerance of 
each organisation. In table 1, weighting factors associated with risk factors from 
different domains are provided, such tables are maintained by the administrator from 
each domain. In the case of technical and behavioural risk indicators, weighting 
values are assigned based on the alert status/count associated with each risk element; 
while scenario effect parameters are the determinants of weighting values in the case 
of personality risk factor. For instance, in the technical risk domain, 
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unlicensed/unauthorised software installation requires just a single count (one 
occurrence) and a weighting factor of 0.38. The rest of this section provides a brief 
description of each domain and risk factors considered for this work. 
 
Personality Notation Security Scenario Effect Weight 
Openness O Low sense of sanction severity 0.35 
Conscientiousness C Low sense of response efficacy 0.21 
Extraversion E Low sense of threat severity, threat 
vulnerability and response cost 
0.45 
Agreeableness A Low sense of sanction certainty 0.25 
Narcissism N Low sense of sanction certainty 0.65 
Technical Notation Alert Status/Count Weight 
Unauthorized logins UL 1 0.28 
VPN/Remote logins VRL 2 0.36 
Unauthorised Software Installation USI 1 0.38 
File Deletion/Modification FDM 1 0.32 
Viruses/Malware VM 3 0.25 
Behaviour Notation Alert Status/Count Weight 
Destructive Behaviour DB 2 0.38 
Intolerance to Criticism IC 3 0.43 
Security Violation SV 2 0.32 
Drug and Alcohol Abuse DAA 3 0.45 
Isolation and Seclusion IS 4 0.28 
Table 1: Risk indicators. 
3.1 Personality Risk Factors 
There are different methods and assessment tools like the Myers-Briggs Type 
Indicator (MBTI), NEO-PI-R, survey questions and social media profiling that can 
be utilised to measure personality traits based on the big-five psychological construct 
of Openness, Conscientiousness, Extroversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism 
(OCEAN). Then each element of OCEAN can be related to a significant aspect of 
behaviour. Although, personality trait is fairly stable throughout an individual’s 
lifetime and it could be a key determinant of intentions but studies suggest that 
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individuals with the same personality react differently to the same condition 
depending on associated security scenarios like self-efficacy, sanction severity, 
sanction certainty and response cost [23]. The personality risk factors aspect of this 
work is mainly based on the empirical studies conducted in [7], [23] and we 
summarise this in table 1 by showing the cross-level relationship that exists between 
personality types and security scenario effects. Weight is assigned to the perso-
nality/security scenario interaction based on behavioural intention to violate 
cybersecurity protocol. 
3.2 Technical Risk Factors 
There are varieties of security tools [24][25][26]that can be deployed for network and 
host level assessment. Although, most of these tools are based on audit process that 
performs security checks against known vulnerabilities but they can provide 
a snapshot of technical risk factors within an organisation. For instance, tools like the 
SIEM/log analysis and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) can provide sufficient 
information on the changes to configuration file binaries, access authentication logs 
and other anomalies from which a logical connection can be drawn about a user’s 
activities [27]. This can allow system administrators to profile a normal user based 
on job roles and privileges, such that, if there is an irregular pattern in the log 
information for a particular user, compared to a normal user for the same role, then 
that may be an indication of a potential malevolent insider activities. Table 1 shows 
some of the hypothesised cyber risks included in this model, indicating the alert status 
(count) for each situational risk factor and the corresponding weighting factor. 
3.3 Behavioural Risk Factors 
Though some behavioural risks like disgruntles, destructive behaviour and policy 
violations could be triggered by external factors that are unrelated to employment or 
criminal backgrounds like anxiety, breakup, depression and debt but may help 
address psychological factors required to form group homogeneity [19], [28]. 
Behaviour and external environmental influences can indicate early signs of cyber-
security risks, and the more an individual exhibits one or more combinations of the 
behavioural risk elements, the more likely it is to violate cyber security protocols. 
Human resource staff are particularly well trained to apply observation techniques, 
recognise and report high scoring risk indicators as a predictor of anomalous 
behaviour. Behavioural risk indicators, alerts status and associated weight factor 
considered for this study, is shown in table 3. 
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4 Method and Preliminary Design 
The model considers different types of risk situational factors in an organisation i.e. 
behavioural, personality and technical/system level risk elements from three different 
domains; the human resource (H.R), personality profiling and technical (I.T) domain 
respectively. In line with evidence from literature, we hypothesise that when the 
technical risk factor is used in isolation, it is susceptible to false positives and cannot 
be a strong indication of malicious insider activities. However, when an agent is 
suspected of violating organisation security protocols, other situational risk factors 
can be aggregated to detect with increased accuracy, the pattern of activities that can 
characterise a malevolent insider. Using this approach, organisations can build 
employee profile and define a ‘normal’ risk threshold (R.T), based on threat 
indicators and the job role for that employee. To determine R.T, consider the high-
level abstractions for the conceptual model shown in figure 1. Data flow from the 
3 domain streams are combined and processed for a single value output. Data from 
social network platforms, surveys, 360-degree profiler and other personality tests can 
be leveraged to obtain personality trait for an employee. Also, by constantly 
monitoring and analysing behavioural risks and psychological state for that employee, 
the Human resource (H.R) can provide data for a given time, indicating the 
behavioural risks for that employee. Similarly, incident log data obtained from IT 
department can provide input for the employee technical risk indicators. These 
inputs can then be analysed to determine an acceptable R.T for that employee. 
Employee activities are then monitored over a period e.g. monthly and risk score 
(R.S) is compared to a defined risk threshold (R.T). If there is a significant deviation 
from the ‘normal’ pattern in each time period, the system flags warning triggers risk-
status for that employee and the employee is placed under close supervision; thereby 
invoking the organisation’s standard threat mitigating procedure. If risk threshold is 
not met or exceeded, risk-status is not triggered and observation simply continues. 
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 Figure 1: High-level abstraction of the insider threat modelling. 
The key assumption in this model is how weighting values are assigned to risk 
elements of the threat indicators, as shown in table 2. For instance, we combine the 
personality traits from the ‘OCEAN’ construct and scenario level association for each 
of the ‘OCEAN’ risk elements, to obtain cross-level interactions for the intention to 
commit computer abuse, as described in [23]. Then a weighted value is assigned to 
each personality trait based security risk associated with each personality type, as 
described in the previous section 3. This step is then repeated for behavioural and 
technical risk indicators, such that, risk elements (Re) from each risk domain have 
corresponding weights (ReW), as shown in table 2.  
Domain Risk Factors 
prisk-i Re O C E A N 
 ReW 0.35 0.21 0.45 0.25 0.65 
brisk-i Re DB IC SV DAA IS 
 ReW 0.38 0.43 0.32 0.45 0.28 
trisk-i Re UL VRL USI FDM VM 
 ReW 0.28 0.36 0.38 0.32 0.25 
Table 2: Risk Elements. 
38
To determine the security risk status for an employee and decide if such an employee 
constitute insider risk to an organisation, consider the high-level algorithm for the 
malicious insider threat detection in table 3. Firstly, organisations decide the value of 
R.T for an employee, which is the number corresponding to acceptable risk baseline 
for that employee. Each of the risk domains, i.e. personality risk indicators (prisk-i), 
technical risk indicators (trisk-i) and behavioural risk indicators (brisk-i) have associated 
Re. The input to the model has combined Re from each of the prisk-i, brisk-i and trisk-i 
domains. However, each Re has associated and predetermined weighting factor ReW. 
Also, each employee has a state for a given period with respect to Re, such that; if the 
state of Re is TRUE, the corresponding value for ReW is returned. The output from 
the model is a numeric value R.S. For a given period, R.S is obtained by aggregating 
all the ReW for that employee. If R.S is greater or equal to the R.T set for that employee, 
then it is assumed that insider threat activity is detected. Then the employee is flagged 
for further investigation, otherwise, normal monitoring simply continues. 
 
Algorithm  
Personality risk indicators = prisk-i 
Behavioural risk indicators = brisk-i 
Technical risk indicators = trisk-i 
Risk-threshold (R.T) = acceptable baseline allowed for an employee. 
Risk Score (R.S) 
Risk Elements = Re 
Risk Element Weights = ReW 
 
STEP 1: FOR each EMPLOYEE:  
There is an input (prisk-i, brisk-i, trisk-i ); 
There is an output (R.S); 
 
               To determine R.S for an EMPLOYEE: 
              Organisation decide values for R.T: 1.55 
              Make a list of all possible Re = {r1, r2, r3……..rn} 
             Make a list of corresponding ReW = {w1, w2, w3……wn} 
 
              There is a STATE = TRUE, FALSE (1, 0) 
              Such that, in each month:  
 
STEP 2:  FOR each employee risk assessment (prisk-i , brisk-i , trisk-i) 
IF the State for Re = 0 
 Return (NULL) 
IF the State for Re = 1 
 Return (ReW); 
R.S = ∑(ReW); 
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IF R.S ≥ R.T 
Insider threat is detected; 
Flag employee as malicious; 
             ELSE IF R.S ≠ R.T 
Return to STEP 1; 
Table 3: High-Level Algorithm for the Malicious Insider Threat Detection 
The preliminary simulation is done in MATLAB by using matrix tables for all true 
states of Re and corresponding ReW. Simulation output of our model is shown in figure 
2. As independent variable changes over the 12-month period, the user risk profile is 
shown as the sum of the ReW from the three risk indicators associated with that user, 
in each time period. For illustrative purposes, the R.T for the employee under 
consideration is set at 1.55. In month 7, the user risk profile is above the R.T value 
of 1.55, set for that user; indicating that insider threat is detected and the user is 
flagged as malicious. In month 7, personality trait ‘O’ is recorded for the user based 
a chosen profiling method. HR records 3 or more counts of ‘DAA’, 2 or more counts 
of ‘DB’ and 4 or more counts of ‘IS’. Similarly, IT security record shows 2 or more 
counts of ‘VRL’. By aggregating all the risk indicators and comparing R.S to the user’s 
R.T, is shows early warnings of malicious insider activities.   
Crucially though, treating each of the threat indicators in isolation is not enough to 
trigger the user as malicious, even though there may be false positive indicators in 
places. Consider month 11, HR brisk-i record for the same user has a risk indicator 
value of 1.11, quite a negligible difference to the record for month 7, which has a brisk-
i value of 1.09. However, the IT trisk-i recorded in month 11 has a risk indicator value 
of zero, which is significantly different to the record for month 7, which has a risk 
indicator value of 0.36. The prisk-i for month 11 and month 7 is also similar, at risk 
indicator values of 0.25 and 0.35 respectively. Therefore, if the user is assessed based 
on brisk-i alone, activities for month 7 and 11 would be flagged, which could trigger 
false positive alert. However, combining all threat indicators from different domains 
shows a significant difference in the user’s activities for both months, and only the 
activity of month 7 exceeds R.T. 
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 Figure 2: Simulation output showing how to detect malicious  
insider activities from multiple risk indicators 
5 Conclusion 
The starting point for managing organisation risk is the insider threat assessment, 
upon which management can build extra layers of controls like policy guidelines, 
awareness training and technical security solutions. We propose an approach that can 
get valuable insight into the activities of malicious insider so that organisations can 
have more information to draw inferences about insider actions during an 
investigation. This work describes an analytical model that considers risk elements 
from different risk domains, such that when each domain is treated in isolation, it 
leads to insufficient evidence of malicious intention. However, when the intersection 
of different risk indicators is considered as a single block, it offers a considerable 
improvement to the possibility of detecting an insider threat. The results in this paper 
have been explained with reference to theories and past literature and we suggest that 
future research examines the relationship and key attributes that specifically link 
evidence of malicious intentions from technical log information, human behaviour 
and personality traits. As part of future work, we hope to empirically explore this 
model and evaluate its sustainability in real world cases like banking organisations. 
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